Post by account_disabled on Feb 27, 2024 1:09:22 GMT -5
In this galloping crisis of Hispanic conservatives, we are facing another clic of the many known ways to obtain power: The coup, sometimes by state, sometimes by hand. The coups are evidence and not just symptoms of antidemocratic models, whatever their ideological sign. Even those who have historically justified themselves on the left to “return” to the people what was supposedly theirs and “empower them” have never achieved such a laudable objective; but, quite the contrary, they have become despicable examples of corruption and cannibalism of power. Every day there is a living example that demonstrates this and there is no positive political result that refutes it. Coups or coups d'état always lead to democratically unacceptable personal Caesarism, corruption of power or dictatorship. Within the framework of representative democracies, which already seem to be consolidated such as the Spanish one, after forty-five years of democratic experience and civil peace, this type of phenomenon unfortunately appears and too frequently within the parties that have the mission to exemplify citizens with a reasonable model of political coexistence.
Democracy is nothing other than a peaceful regulation of relations between different people, only subject to the rule of law by popular votes in which the exercise of national sovereignty resides. And, therefore, the political parties that make up this representation have, yes or yes, to act under those same principles of internal exemplarity to promote the political Guatemala Mobile Number List education of their voters and the population. The left, in the impossible dream of a unity that never arrives, tends or has tended too often to ignore those basic norms of coexistence within it when choosing a policy or a leader. However, there is an indisputable referential tendency: the more Caesarism a leader acMilkulates in the exercise of organic power, the more disaffection he produces in his potential voters and his internal discrepancies translate into Cainite divisions and irreparable splits. On the contrary, the broader and more democratic the size and internal life of the organization, the structuring of power is undoubtedly more complex and difficult to manage, but the secularism of these behaviors produces more flexible expansion joints between the dissidents and allows a better coexistence between them.
In order not to delve into the political pleistocene, we only have to point out the vicissitudes of the two main leftist organizations in Spain in their recent crises and their different ways of resolving them. Both have suffered internal coups with very different outcomes. The most apparent and bloody in the media was that of the PSOE, with a baronage and some historical references of contemporary Spanish socialism who staged an authentic tour de force, defenestration "manu militari" of its general secretary (Pedro Sánchez) to the ephemeral and strident cry of a unknown “highest authority” in the midst of tensions and insults in its highest management body. But that conflict was not based on a mere fight for power, but on the political orientation of the party in relation to its alliances with other forces and its acceptance or not of a conservative government chaired by Mariano Rajoy. Which happened. No means No or the abstention that allowed it was the dilemma. And it was above all a political question.
Democracy is nothing other than a peaceful regulation of relations between different people, only subject to the rule of law by popular votes in which the exercise of national sovereignty resides. And, therefore, the political parties that make up this representation have, yes or yes, to act under those same principles of internal exemplarity to promote the political Guatemala Mobile Number List education of their voters and the population. The left, in the impossible dream of a unity that never arrives, tends or has tended too often to ignore those basic norms of coexistence within it when choosing a policy or a leader. However, there is an indisputable referential tendency: the more Caesarism a leader acMilkulates in the exercise of organic power, the more disaffection he produces in his potential voters and his internal discrepancies translate into Cainite divisions and irreparable splits. On the contrary, the broader and more democratic the size and internal life of the organization, the structuring of power is undoubtedly more complex and difficult to manage, but the secularism of these behaviors produces more flexible expansion joints between the dissidents and allows a better coexistence between them.
In order not to delve into the political pleistocene, we only have to point out the vicissitudes of the two main leftist organizations in Spain in their recent crises and their different ways of resolving them. Both have suffered internal coups with very different outcomes. The most apparent and bloody in the media was that of the PSOE, with a baronage and some historical references of contemporary Spanish socialism who staged an authentic tour de force, defenestration "manu militari" of its general secretary (Pedro Sánchez) to the ephemeral and strident cry of a unknown “highest authority” in the midst of tensions and insults in its highest management body. But that conflict was not based on a mere fight for power, but on the political orientation of the party in relation to its alliances with other forces and its acceptance or not of a conservative government chaired by Mariano Rajoy. Which happened. No means No or the abstention that allowed it was the dilemma. And it was above all a political question.